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I. INTRODUCTION:
Sunken treasure has the ability to fascinate and draw to it all
who dream of riches beyond belief. The popular press estimates
that there are potentially hundreds of billions of dollars in
salvageable cultural property and treasure currently residing on
the bottom of the ocean floor.3 Much of this lost property exists in
the form of gold and jewels removed from the civilizations of the
new world in the Western Hemisphere to meet the demand cre-
ated by the burgeoning kingdom of Spain–a decidedly Inter-Amer-
ican issue. However, unlike the historical explorers of days past,
today’s treasure seekers are using sophisticated technological
advancements to better map potential targets, and are funded by
investors willing to bet big on finding the next lost treasure; there-
fore, it is not uncommon for individuals to establish well-organ-
ized corporations for the sole purpose of finding and salvaging
purportedly abandoned ships carrying lost treasure.4
Moreover, technology once used by global corporations in
deep-sea oil exploration and drilling now serves as an advanced
tool to locate wrecks, including wrecks at depths not possible prior
to these advances in technology.5 The twenty-first century discov-
ery of ships containing lost treasure has reignited the passion for
discovery in major investors such as hedge funds and private
equity firms,6 but these modern treasure hunts also serve as a sig-
nificant threat to cultural heritage and the sovereign rights of the
countries who lost these valuable cargos.7 Absent a core set of
principles, salvors may become the next wave of cultural property
3. Rob Goodier, What’s the Total Value of the World’s Sunken Treasure?, POPULAR
MECHANICS (Feb. 22, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/
engineering/gonzo/whats-the-total-value-of-the-worlds-sunken-treasure; Eoghan
Macguire, Why Scouring Sea for Sunken Treasures is Big Business, CNN MAINSAIL
(Mar. 14, 2013, 7:47 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/13/business/sunken-treasure-
business/.
4. Lawrence D. Stone, Search for the SS Central America: Mathematical
Treasure Hunting, Interfaces 22, 32-54 (1992) (available at http://pubsonline.informs
.org/doi/abs/10.1287/inte. 22.1.32).
5. Christopher R. Bryant, The Archeological Duty of Care: The Legal,
Professional, and Cultural Struggle over Salvaging Historically Significant
Shipwrecks, 65 ALB. L. REV. 97, 106 (2001).
6. Id.
7. See id.
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looters without the world even recognizing that these culturally
sensitive locations are being lost at an alarming rate.
This note will form a prescriptive guide for future disputes
based on significant cases brought in American courts8 regarding
the salvage of wrecks containing cultural property and lost trea-
sure. Because this area of law is thoroughly complex and uncer-
tain, this common law analysis provides a basis from which a
claim may be based and advanced in American courts—there is no
“right” answer in this area of law, and more frequently than not,
courts are reluctant to decide in a manner that would foreclose
future development. Throughout this note’s analysis of several
significant cases, however, a model of the United States’ treat-
ment of the salvage of shipwrecks will emerge, allowing for the
development of a working framework for future litigation involv-
ing similar circumstances. Part II presents an overview of the par-
ties involved in maritime treasure salvage. Part III discusses the
current structure of maritime salvage law as it relates to sunken
treasure. Finally, Parts IV and V provide a basis of knowledge for
future cases involving maritime treasure salvage through an anal-
ysis of the key principles of law and modern jurisprudence in the
area.
II. STAKEHOLDERS:
While today’s discoveries come from deeper and more remote
areas of the globe’s oceans, salvors of years past relied on the rela-
tively shallow waters of Florida and the Caribbean to locate and
salvage wrecks. Salvage is a labor-intensive process involving
both the requisite intellect to discover lost shipwrecks and the
physical strength to explore the depths of the ocean and bring lost
treasure to surface. As will later be discussed, the common law
principle of salvage was created to incentivize salvors to risk their
lives to recover wrecked ships; however, today’s incentive may
have shifted beyond a reward system for those who put them-
selves in peril, to an incentive for a purely profit-seeking salvage
system. At law, a salvor is defined as either “[a] person who saves
a vessel and its cargo from danger or loss,” or as a person who
“without any particular relation to a ship in distress, proffers use-
ful service . . . [and who] must have the intention and capacity to
save the distressed property involved, but need not have an intent
8. This Note draws from cases brought in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit.
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to acquire it.”9 This definition hardly fits many of today’s salvage
companies, which strategically target shipwrecks lost centuries
ago. Even given this shift in salvor identity, today’s salvors fre-
quently argue that, should they be prohibited from working
wrecks, both the treasure and history of the site will be forever
lost.10
Opposite today’s profit-seeking salvors are preservationists
who aim to protect historically significant wrecks from exploita-
tion and destructive recovery.11 Many underwater archeologists
think of wrecks as a combination of underwater museum and
gravesite.12 That is, all wrecks contain more than trea-
sure–cultural artifacts and the ship itself serve as a frozen-in-time
display of history.13 Additionally, many wrecks still contain
human remains of sailors in veritable “underwater cemeteries” of
those who perished during the sinking.14 The preservationist
group is not limited to archeologists and academics–included is
the United States federal government, which has a centuries-old
tradition of protecting culturally significant sites for the American
people.15 The U.S., therefore, has the duty of balancing between
allowing immediate exploitation of the discovery to recover lost
treasure and protection of the wreck site for ongoing preservation
and possible income from tourism.16
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE LAW:
Multiple levels of international, federal, state, and common
law control the law of salvage. Legislative responses to underwa-
ter treasure and cultural property have not developed the body of
law that is needed when examining claims in federal court with
increased frequency and complexity, so the only method to ade-
quately prepare for future cases is a common law examination of
past decisions. Today’s claims often involve parties from insurance
underwriters, successors in interest ranging from the Spanish and
9. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 697 (9th ed. 2009) (citing 68 AM. JUR. 2d Salvage § 2,
at 270 (1993)).
10. See Bryant, supra note 5, at 65.
11. Lawrence J. Khan, Sunken Treasures: Conflicts Between Historic Preservation
Law and the Maritime Law of Finds, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 595, 597-600 (1994).
12. Bryant, supra note 5, at 99-100.
13. Id. at 99.
14. Bryant, supra note 5, at 97, 99-100.
15. Khan, supra note 11, at 597-600, 630-39 (comparing the United States’ role in
acquiring historically significant lands since its first purchase of battlefields following
the Civil War).
16. Id. at 640.
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United States’ governments to the descendants of Napoleon and
the Spanish royal family. Today, a salvor, his company, his finan-
ciers, and his counsel, are tasked with international and federal
law from which American courts use to decide highly contested
disputes. There is a variety of federal law, including admiralty
regulation, which applies to claims; additionally, there are inter-
national conventions protecting cultural property. Finally, there
are state law remedies for disputes involving the salvage of ship-
wrecks in state territorial waters or under the jurisdiction of a
state court. The applicable law, therefore, is decided by factors
such as location (e.g., within a state’s or country’s territorial
waters) and whether there is customary international law that the
United States is trying to protect to the detriment of a group of
likely profit-motivated salvors.
The Underwater Cultural Heritage project at the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(“UNESCO”) bases its standards for maritime salvage of cultur-
ally sensitive sites on the estimate that there are over three mil-
lion shipwrecks globally.17 UNESCO’s core assertion is that these
sites “can provide precious historical information . . . function[ing]
as a time capsule, [and] providing a complete snapshot of the life
on board at the time of sinking.”18 Proper attention and preserva-
tion methods can provide sustainable recovery of cargo that is not
culturally sensitive while still protecting both the archeological
and socially important aspect of these wreck sites. UNESCO also
recognizes that many of these wrecks contain valuable cargo of
interest for the arts and other cultural organizations, to the sum
of some three thousand individual wrecks.19 The nexus between
the valuable and recoverable goods located at these sites and the
historical and archeological importance of intact wrecks is where
the most fracturing disputes lay; however, and quite often, dis-
putes emerge between the salvor and wrecked ship’s owner for the
bounty once the treasure is found.
In 1982, the United Nations ratified UNESCO’s draft of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).20
17. UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION
(UNESCO), Wrecks (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/
underwater-cultural-heritage/the-underwater-heritage/wrecks/.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural
Heritage (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.unesco.org/culture/underwater/infokit_en/files/
gb-2001convention-infokit%2007-2009.pdf.
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UNCLOS has more than 160 state parties, and it contains, among
other important areas of maritime law, provisions on sovereignty
at sea.21 However, the treaty has no explicit provision regarding
sensitive shipwrecks other than a general call for parties to pro-
tect underwater cultural heritage.22 Notably though, the Conven-
tion expressly left open more specific international agreement
through Article 303(4).23 This opening in Article 303(4) allows the
2001 international agreement on the Convention on the Protection
of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (“UCH”) to emerge as a
source of international agreement for the protection of culturally
sensitive shipwrecks.24 This agreement is “specifically dedicated to
‘guaranteeing . . . preservation through a specific protection and
cooperation framework . . . .’ ”25 The United States is not a ratify-
ing party to either UNCLOS nor UCH, thus American courts are
not bound by this international obligation when addressing cases
involving salvors’ claims on ships containing cultural property or
treasure when brought under the American law.26 Many American
courts, as well as the United States government, recognize the
often-sensitive nature of salvaging a sovereign lost ship, and the
defense of the owner’s rights often is more vigorous in response to
these cases. Of note, other major seafaring nations have also opted
out of ratifying UCH, indicating a general consensus against
international agreement regarding salvage operations–largely
because of the burdensome prohibition in these agreements of
commercial exploration.27
Even with this unclear arena of international law, courts in
the United States are not without guidance when examining cases
21. Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the
[United Nations] Convention [on the Law of the Sea] and the Related Agreements as at
29 October 2013 (Feb. 15, 2014) (available at https://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_
files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm) (notably, the United States is not a
ratifying party to UNCLOS, but Spain became a signatory on January 15, 1997).
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See generally, John Kimball, Living with the Convention on the Protection of
the Underwater Cultural Heritage: New Jurisdictions, ODYSSEY MARINE EXPLORATION
PAPERS 13 (2010) (available at http://unescoscience.blogspot.com/2010/08/is-unesco-
underwater-heritage.html).
27. John Daly, Is the UNESCO Underwater Heritage Convention Well
Considered?, UNESCO IN THE SPOTLIGHT: SCIENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS BLOG (Aug.
16, 2010, 10:38 AM), http://unescoscience.blogspot.com/2010/08/is-unesco-under
water-heritage.html (included in the list of other non-ratifying nations is France,
Germany, Japan, Russia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.).
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involving maritime salvage and proper ownership of sunken cul-
tural property and treasure. In 1988, the United States Congress
passed the Abandoned Shipwrecks Act (“ASA”) in order to regu-
late salvage rights involving salvors in American jurisdictions.28
The Abandoned Shipwrecks Act defines a salvor’s ability to profit
from discovering a lost or wrecked ship. Upon enactment, the gov-
ernment of the state in which the wreck is located retained a prop-
erty interest in any shipwreck that was “embedded” in a state’s
submerged land.29 However, the wording of the statute has been
criticized as ambiguous and there is ongoing dispute between
states interested in maintaining control over wreck sites and sal-
vors claiming that individual states are failing to prove ownership
under the law’s requirements.30 This dispute mimics the ongoing
dispute between salvor’s rights involving a large percentage of
recovered property even though the original owner retains the
property right, and the law of finds where salvors retain the prop-
erty right in full.
More importantly than the Abandoned Shipwrecks Act, how-
ever, is the post-1985 assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction by
American courts regarding foreign shipwrecks and interested par-
ties from the United States. This extra-territorial application
brings the world’s oceans, including those parts located outside
the United States’ sovereign territory, within the jurisdiction of
American federal courts. Generally though, even if a court were to
grant in rem jurisdiction, that is to assert jurisdiction over the sal-
vaged property, based on the salvor’s proof that some part of a
wreck is in the United States, the court’s reach would be effec-
tively limited to the jurisdictional authority granted to it by Arti-
cle III of the United States Constitution, which extends no further
than the territorial boundaries of the United States and its terri-
tories.31 However, when applying the law of salvage, and its inter-
national applicability, American courts have sometimes craftily
circumvented the limits of state sovereignty by asserting that
international law allows extra-territorial enforcement through a
sort of international common law originating in both Ancient
Rome and the Law of the Sea.32
Overall, these options of law for the deciding court provide
28. Abandoned Shipwrecks Act. PUB. L. NO. 100-298; 43 U.S.C. §§ 2100-06 (1988).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (Federal jurisdiction extends to controversies “to
which the United States shall be a party . . . .”).
32. See Brooke Wright, Keepers, Weepers, or No Finders at All: The Effect of
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great leeway for a trial judge, and as such, the opportunity for a
common law analysis of the application of law rather than a statu-
tory analysis of how each law should be applied, if chosen.
IV. COMMON LAW APPROACH TO SALVAGE CLAIMS:
While there is a great deal of legal groundwork already estab-
lished for American courts to draw from in decision-making dur-
ing maritime salvage disputes, the overwhelming trend is to
continue allowing claimants the approach of disputing whether
the law of finds or the law of salvage applies to each specific case.
The law preferred by salvors in recent disputes is one of
“finds”—under which the finder acquires good title against the
original owner—effectively depriving the original owner of the
benefit of the property.33 The law of finds is preferred to the law of
salvage in the eyes of the recovering party because the standard is
much lower for total control and ownership of the salvaged prop-
erty.34 The substantive requirement on the salvor is to prove that
the original owner has abandoned the property.35
Another option for the court is under the law of salvage,
where the salvor has three elements to prove a right to compensa-
tion for recovering the property: (1) a voluntary effort on the part
of the salvor; (2) peril or danger from which the salvage occurs; (3)
success in salvage.36
In the realm of international law from which American courts
may draw core principles, the UNESCO framework focuses
squarely on the recognition that most of today’s disputes are over
shipwreck salvage operations involving long-lost ships, often car-
rying valuable cargo. However, these “ships of gold” also carry a
frozen-in-time historical record of what happened the day that
they sank; thus, the value lost to society in terms of archeological
study may be much greater than American courts realize when
applying more antiquated legal principles in deciding these cases.
A particular court may adopt whichever application of law in
modern salvage cases it sees fit, but there are several overarching
themes to the applicable precedent. First, these cases almost inva-
International Trends on the Exercise of U.S. Jurisdiction and Substantive Law in the
Salvage of Historic Wrecks, 33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 285 (Winter 2008).
33. Id. at 302.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 303.
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riably involve the Abandoned Shipwreck Act37 and the friction
between the law of salvage and the law of finds. Second, interna-
tional relations and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act influ-
ence how courts decide in this area of law.
a. The Abandoned Shipwreck Act:
The Abandoned Shipwreck Act (“ASA”) provides a basis for
state claims of ownership as well as a springboard for salvors to
claim a reward for their salvage operations.38 While the Act textu-
ally favors the law of salvage, it is common for salvage operators
to start anew with each case and claim property rights under the
law of finds; thus, rehashing otherwise settled law in disputes
that should be easily decided by the principle of stare decisis.
Courts, including the Fourth Circuit in the cases discussed in this
note, generally recognize the law of salvage as a time-honored tra-
dition in maritime law, recognizing that the incentivization struc-
ture of a salvage model is preferable over a finders-keepers policy
when addressing public policy. However, the Fourth Circuit also
re-hashes otherwise established law with each new case to the
detriment of modern jurisprudence. With the law of salvage, there
is a reward system based on actual need in a time of emergency.
Ownership of lost property at sea remains vested in the original
owner barring specific and rare circumstances of abandonment
proved by a substantial evidentiary showing by the salvor-
claimant.
i. The Requirement for Abandonment:
It is these circumstances of abandonment that are most often
disputed. More specifically, salvors frequently claim that the sal-
vaged property has been abandoned and therefore, the law of finds
applies. In Columbus, the insurance underwriters paid out a one
million dollar loss policy on the gold cargo, but the record reflected
that the underwriters continued attempts at recovery of the lost
treasure for more than one hundred years.39 The Fourth Circuit
clarified that maritime abandonment must come from a scenario
where the property is left with no intention of the original owner
returning. Without such intent, the property is not abandoned to
37. The Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-06.
38. See id.
39. Columbus-America Discovery Grp. v. Atlantic Mut. Inc. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 455
(4th Cir. 1992).
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allow the law of finds as a governing principle of the case.40
In Sea Hunt, the Fourth Circuit continued its analysis regard-
ing the aspect of an original owner abandoning property lost at
sea.41 Although the ASA fails to specifically define “abandonment,”
the court examined the legislative history to establish a high stan-
dard, especially in cases involving ships belonging to sovereign
states.42 Absent express abandonment, that is, the express state-
ment that a sovereign is abandoning the property, the Fourth Cir-
cuit will not recognize property as abandoned for purposes of
maritime salvage claims.43 This principle is reinforced when, at
the time of litigation, the original owner asserts a claim of owner-
ship because of the recent discovery, which is often the cause of
the litigation anyway.
Having thoroughly resolved the issue of whether property
need be expressly abandoned for the law of finds to apply, the
Fourth Circuit turned again to the difference between salvor’s
rights and the law of finds in the dispute over the Titanic.44 In
Titanic, the salvor moved to shift its status from a salvor-in-pos-
session under the law of salvage, to a holder of free title under the
law of finds.45 After a lengthy analysis of the historical record of
application of the two legal schemes, the court resoundingly
announced that the law of salvage is a time-honored tradition in
maritime salvage law, and the only applicable alternative to fur-
ther the legitimate goals of maritime salvage.46
b. The Influence of Federal Agreements and Treaties
on American Salvage Jurisprudence:
While the UNESCO efforts have largely been ignored in
recent United States maritime salvage cases, some federal agree-
ments and international treaties do affect American courts’ exam-
ination of maritime salvage disputes. These treaties and pacts of
mutual understanding impact the global status of the United
States and serve as reciprocal arrangements for the treatment of
wrecked American vessels. Therefore, it is in the United States’
40. Id. at 464.
41. See Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d
634 (4th Cir. 2000).
42. Id. at 640–41.
43. Id. at 642.
44. See R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521
(4th Cir. 2006).
45. Id. at 533.
46. Id. at 530–35, 537.
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interest to maintain the status quo as these analyses often involve
territorial or sovereign issues ranging from coastal boundaries to
the treatment of sunken ships of war. From this application, there
is a clear strain between the relationship of the federal govern-
ment and the states, especially which the states attempt to assert
rights under the ASA.
i. Coastal Territorial Boundaries:
Pursuant to the ASA, a state has immediate claim to wrecks
found abandoned in state-owned lands or waters.47 In Treasure
Salvors, Florida immediately asserted its claim with regard to the
newly discovered treasure of the Atocha, but the state erred in
failing to recognize that the shipwreck was located in an area that
the federal government disputed Florida’s claim to—with the fed-
eral government eventually succeeding in stripping Florida of its
property rights.48 Because of this shift in the state’s seaward
boundary, the salvor’s contract with the state became moot, and
the court recognized that the federal courts may seize salvaged
property once owned by the states through the federal govern-
ment’s in rem jurisdiction.49 Thus, unless a wreck is located in an
area that is indisputably a state’s territory, the federal govern-
ment may intervene in any salvage operation potentially invali-
dating a salvage contract under the ASA.
ii. International Goodwill Towards American Friends and
Allies:
The Sea Hunt case demonstrates the federal government’s
policy of maintaining goodwill with allied nations, even to the det-
riment of states’ rights.50 Pursuant to a 1902 treaty, the United
States recognized the sovereignty of shipwrecks and military
gravesites of the two Spanish ships, thus dissolving state claims
emanating from the ASA for states in which Spanish Royal Navy
ships sunk.51 Under the 1902 treaty, Spain must have expressly
abandoned the ships for Virginia to assert property rights over
them under the ASA.52 Spain’s intervening claim was defended
fervently by the United States in federal court, indicating a clear
47. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(c).
48. Fla. Dep’t of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982).
49. Id. at 671–72.
50. Sea Hunt, Inc., 221 F.3d at 634.
51. Id. at 642.
52. Id.
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preference for the protection of the United States’ relationship
with Spain over the protection of Virginia’s right to assert salvage
rights over ships wrecked in its territorial waters.53
iii. Comity in American Courts:
In Titanic, R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. (“RMST”), the salvor initially
recovered almost two thousand artifacts in 1987 that were trans-
ported to France for preservation.54 Once the artifacts were in
France, RMST obtained title from an administrator of the French
Office of Maritime Affairs of the Ministry of Equipment, Transpor-
tation, and Tourism.55 During the litigation in the United States,
RMST moved for an American court to recognize the French
administrative ruling on title to the artifacts.56 Both the district
court and the Fourth Circuit refused to recognize the French dec-
laration of title under the principle of comity because the courts
found that the French declaration lacked a proper adjudicative
base. In addition, there were insufficient findings by the French
administrator for an American court to adopt the French deci-
sion.57  This recognition of the insufficient nature of a foreign pro-
cess potentially places many non-American decisions regarding
title of maritime salvage in question unless the foreign process
sufficiently and without conflict replicates the process in the
United States.
iv. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) provides that
foreign ships of war are largely immune from, among other things,
arrest by American courts even in times of salvage.58 This protec-
tion is an indication of a reciprocal relationship aimed at protect-
ing American assets abroad—the agreement at its core protects
foreign assets in the United States barring certain specific, and
unrelated conditions that waive the protection of the Act.59 In
determining whether the property is immune under the FSIA, a
court must examine whether the property was that of a foreign
53. Id.
54. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc., 435 F.3d at 524.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 524–25.
58. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610–11 (providing exceptions allowing for arrest of sovereign
property in the United States including times of war and governments classified as
state sponsors of terror).
59. Id. at § 1610(d)(1).
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state, and whether the FSIA exemptions grant federal courts
authority over the property. Additionally, if the property is being
used for commercial purposes, the FSIA protections may not
apply.60 However, unless there is a sufficient showing of eviden-
tiary support that the foreign ship was operating as a commercial
vessel, the FSIA will likely apply, thus shielding the ship from
salvage claims in American courts.
V. CASES:
a. Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
458 U.S. 670 (1982)
One of the first issues addressed in modern salvage jurispru-
dence is whether in a territorial dispute between the federal gov-
ernment and a U.S. state, the federal government may assert its
admiralty in rem jurisdiction to seize and arrest salvaged treasure
from the disputed territory. This issue arises when there is disa-
greement as to where the state’s territorial limit ends and the fed-
eral government’s begins.
In the spring of 1971, treasure hunter Mel Fisher and his
company, Treasure Salvors, discovered the lost wreck of the Nues-
tra Senora de Atocha (“Atocha”), a three hundred year old Spanish
galleon that sank in stormy weather in 1622.61 The Atocha carried
a cargo of gold and emeralds from the Americas en route to King
Phillip IV of Spain.6263  Based on Fisher’s research, Treasure Sal-
vors located the wreck some forty nautical miles west of Key West,
which the state of Florida claimed was within its territorial juris-
diction.64 Immediately after the wreck’s discovery, Florida notified
Fisher that the state owned the wreck and its contents pursuant
to a state law65 that grants the state property rights to treasure or
artifacts “which have been abandoned on state-owned lands [or
waters].”66 Additionally, Florida asserted the notion that public
policy dictates the state’s ownership in culturally significant prop-
60. Id.
61. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. at 673–74.
62. Id. at 673.
63. To this day treasures are still discovered from the Atocha wreck–including an
emerald and gold ring found in 2011 worth an estimated $500,000. See Aparece Tesoro
en el fondo del mar en Florida, EL NUEVO DIA, http://www.elnuevodia.com/
aparecetesoroenelfondodelmarenflorida-1000106.html, June 24, 2011, 11:41 a.m.
64. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. at 673.
65. See Fla. Stat. § 267.061(1)(b).
66. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. at 673-74.
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erty when abandoned within its territory.67
When Florida became aware that Treasure Salvors had dis-
covered the Atocha wreck site, the State threatened to arrest Mel
Fisher and his team if he did not execute a proper salvage contract
granting title and partial value of the recovered treasure to the
state.68 In response, Fisher agreed to a one-year salvage and recov-
ery contract.69 Florida’s position was that even if its state law
claim failed, it was in the best position as a matter of public policy
to control such a significant discovery.70
Contemporaneous to the dispute between Fisher and Florida,
proceedings between Florida and the United States to determine
the “seaward boundary of submerged lands in the Atlantic Ocean
and the Gulf of Mexico in which the State had rights to natural
resources,” pursuant to applicable federal law were ongoing.71 The
federal government won a judgment granting it ownership of the
seabed upon which the wreck of the Atocha was discovered,72 and
that decision successfully shifted the boundary where Florida
could claim territorial ownership of the shipwreck under state law
inward from its previous position.
When Treasure Salvors learned of the United States’ victory
regarding the jurisdiction of Florida and the state’s seafloor, it
immediately sought and received declaratory judgment from the
Southern District of Florida, granting Treasure Salvors title in
rem to the wreck and all remaining treasure contained within,
with the decision based on the federal governments admiralty in
rem jurisdiction.73 Treasure Salvors then sought and received a
warrant to seize all existing artifacts from Florida, which were
stored in the state’s capital of Tallahassee; however, in response,
Florida challenged the government’s issuance of the in rem war-
rant, but lost in both the trial and appellate phases of the federal
proceeding.74
At the final stage of litigation, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the district court’s issuance of a
seizure warrant against Florida violated the Eleventh Amend-
67. Id.
68. Id. at 675 (Fisher retained the right to 75% of the value of the recovered
treasure while the State of Florida retained title to the salvaged property).
69. Id. at 674 (Similar contracts were renewed for three successive years).
70. Id. at 673–74.
71. Id. at 675.
72. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. at 676.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 679–80.
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ment regarding the federal government’s authority.7576 The
Supreme Court held that while Florida enjoys limited immunity
from federal process under the Eleventh Amendment, its officers
do not.7778 Additionally, because this case involved a warrant
served against officers of the Florida Archives and not against the
state itself, the federal government successfully pierced the veil of
immunity.79
At its most basic, the Supreme Court resolved a question of
whether a United States federal court could “seize artifacts held
by [the] state . . . and bring the property within its admiralty in
rem jurisdiction,” ultimately finding that the federal court may, in
fact, assert its jurisdiction in such a scenario.80 Therefore, a state
may not assert sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment as a shield against the federal government’s seizing treasure
contained within a state’s territorial waters if those waters are
disputed territory between the state and the federal government,
and if the federal government wins the territorial dispute.81 At
this point, because of this dispute, the State of Florida owns no
treasure recovered from the wreck of the Atocha.82
b. Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Co., et al., 974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992)
In the summer of 1857, the S.S. Central America sank to a
depth of almost eight thousand feet amid a hurricane some 160
miles off of the South Carolina coast.83 Aboard the ship was a
cargo of gold valued at more than two million dollars, which was
insured by both American and British insurance companies.84
75. Id. at 682.
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another States, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.”).
77. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. at 682.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
79. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. at 682.
80. Id. at 683.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
82. There remains a separate inquiry, not addressed by this Note, as to Spain’s
involvement into the Atocha wreck as ship was a Spanish flag ship.
83. Columbus-America Discovery Grp. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 455
(4th Cir. 1992).
84. The S.S. Central America traveled with 30,000 pounds of gold aboard. At a
modern estimate price of two thousand dollars per ounce, this cargo would be worth
$960,000,000 today. This tremendous loss is connected with the American economic
Panic of 1857. Id.
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Immediately following the S.S. Central America’s sinking, its
insurers began attempts to recover the lost gold.85 As quickly as
two weeks after the disaster, insurers began negotiating with sal-
vage companies to find and retrieve the cargo.86 Moreover, in 1858,
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, a party-insurer, contracted
with salvor Brutus de Villeroi to recover the gold in exchange for
seventy-five percent of the recovery plus expenses.87 In the 1970s,
because the wreck remained undiscovered, several salvage compa-
nies began contacting the insurance underwriters to negotiate sal-
vage contracts with them–among these salvage companies was
Columbus.88 No contract ever came from the negotiation.89
In 1988, the Columbus-America Discovery Group (“Colum-
bus”) discovered the wreck.90 From the 1988 until 1991, Columbus
recovered gold bullion from the site, but not until 1991 did it
request preemptive declaratory judgment in rem that it was the
rightful owner of the treasure to quiet any other claims of owner-
ship.91 However, once Columbus filed the initial request for judg-
ment, the original insurance underwriters of the cargo intervened
by asserting ownership of the gold.92 The position of the insurers
was that because they had paid claims on the loss, the recovered
gold was their property.93
The trial court heard testimony on Columbus’ claim that the
insurers abandoned their interest in the gold, and ultimately
found that the insurers had affirmatively abandoned any inter-
ests.94 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed in a proceeding that
dealt primarily with error involving the abandonment of the perti-
nent claims by the intervening insurers.95 The appeals court held
that Columbus failed to meet its burden to show that the insur-
ance underwriters indeed abandoned their claims.96
In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the com-
mon law approach to salvage was that when ships or cargo were
lost at sea, the salvors are entitled to liberal salvage awards
85. Id. at 456-57.
86. Id. at 457.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Columbus-America Discovery, 974 F.2d at 457.
90. Id. at 455.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 456.
95. Columbus-America Discovery, 974 F.2d at 456.
96. Id.
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though the original owners still retain ownership interest in the
property.97 However, the Fourth Circuit also referenced the com-
mon law doctrine of finds; which, at its most basic, states that he
who finds treasure may keep it.98 This clear conflict of doctrine is
what American courts are tasked with resolving in similar cases
today. American federal courts sitting in admiralty jurisdiction
favor the salvage law model over the law of finds because the lat-
ter model provides benefit to what the courts have described as
“unsavory conduct,” while discouraging those with legitimate
interests in the discovery and salvage of lost property.99 Further-
ing the courts discussion on its preference for the law of salvage, it
asserted that the law of finds is almost exclusively “applied to pre-
viously owned sunken property only when that property has been
abandoned by its previous owners . . . [a]bandonment in this sense
means much more than merely leaving the property.”100
Actual abandonment in the maritime sense requires more
than an owner or agent leaving a sinking vessel at a time of disas-
ter, for that would open the courts to frivolous claims in all water-
borne jurisdictions. Here, the Fourth Circuit turns to a contempo-
rary Fifth Circuit decision stating that “the act of deserting prop-
erty without hope of recovery or intention of returning to it” is
abandonment for application of the law of finds.101 To meet such a
rigid criterion, a wreck must either be expressly abandoned, or be
so ancient for there to be no apparent successor in interest.102
Therefore, aside from a salvor’s showing of clear and convincing
evidence that there was actual abandonment, the law of finds is
an unsound principle on which to base a salvage claim to a wreck.
c. Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel
or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000)
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Spanish
Royal Navy lost several ships including La Galga and the Juno.103
97. Id. at 459.
98. Id. (citing M. NORRIS, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY: THE LAW OF SALVAGE (7th ed.
Rev. 1991)).
99. Id. (quoting Sofaer, J. in Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 356
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
100. Id. at 459.
101. Columbus-America Discovery, 974 F.2d at 461 (citing Nunley v. M/V Dauntless
Colocotronis, 863 F.2d 1190, 1198 (5th Cir. 1989)).
102. Id.
103. Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634,
638 (4th Cir. 2000).
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La Galga was a fifty-gun frigate tasked with escorting merchant
ships from the new world to Spain, and Juno was a thirty-four gun
frigate tasked with carrying military servicemen and their fami-
lies from Africa to the Americas.104 The two ships sank in bad
weather off the Virginia coast in 1750 and in 1802. In 1902, the
United States and Spain signed a Treaty of Friendship and Gen-
eral Relations, which in pertinent part protects shipwrecks and
military gravesites belonging to the two countries from salvage for
profit.105
After recognition that these wrecks may be present, and to
protect its interests, Virginia asserted ownership of the wrecks
under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987106 and issued salvage
permits to Sea Hunt as the exclusive salvor, ignoring the Treaty of
Friendship with Spain.107 To ensure its right to salvage the wreck,
Sea Hunt initiated a declaratory judgment108 in federal court
utilizing the court’s maritime in rem jurisdiction.109 However,
Spain too asserted ownership of the wrecks using the Treaty of
Friendship as support and asked the United States to intervene
on Spain’s behalf.110 Spain claimed, via the United States’ inter-
vention, that under the Treaty of Friendship and General Rela-
tions, a sovereign must expressly abandon the ships in order for a
salvor to win on its current claim of title.111 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, under the law of
finds, found that Spain had expressly abandoned the 1750 ship-
wreck but retained title to the 1802 shipwreck, thereby denying
claim to the wreck to Sea Hunt for the latter wreck but granting
the award for the former wreck.112 Both Spain and Sea Hunt
appealed113, and the Fourth Circuit held that Spain was required
to expressly abandon a shipwreck in order for Virginia to acquire
title to it under the ASA. Therefore, Sea Hunt retained no right to
either shipwreck.114
104. Id. at 638-39.
105. Id. at 638.
106. Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-06 (1994).
107. Sea Hunt, Inc., 221 F.3d at 639.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 640.
112. Id.
113. Because of the procedural complexity of this case involving interveners and
multiple interested parties, it is suggested that the reader review Sea Hunt, Inc., 221
F.3d at 634-641, for added clarity.
114. See Sea Hunt, Inc., 221 F.3d at 634.
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Under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act, title is presumptively
transferred to a state of the United States for any abandoned ship-
wreck that “is on or embedded in the submerged lands of a
[s]tate.”115 Additionally, “title is automatically transferred to the
[s]tate in whose submerged lands the shipwreck is located.”116
Finally, the term “submerged lands” apples to “coastal waters
three miles from shore.”117 Abandonment is the key element in this
case because if Sea Hunt could have proven that Spain had indeed
abandoned or waived its right to the ships, it would have retained
title by grant from Virginia.
There is no statutory definition for “abandonment” in the
Abandoned Shipwreck Act but an examination of the Act’s legisla-
tive history establishes Congress’ intent was for a separate stan-
dard for sovereign shipwrecks versus shipwrecks of privately
owned vessels; thus, the lower standard of implied abandonment
would not be appropriate when a sovereign nation asserts contin-
ued ownership of a shipwreck, military or otherwise.118 Finally, as
a general principle of admiralty law, when “an owner comes for-
ward to assert ownership in a shipwreck, abandonment must be
shown by express acts.”119 In its decision, the Fourth Circuit recog-
nized that the overwhelming trend of law presented by the United
States’ strenuous defense of Spain’s ownership of these wrecks
overcomes any claim that express abandonment may have
occurred based simply on the passage of time between the ship-
wreck itself and its subsequent discovery.120
Therefore, sovereign wrecks are vulnerable to the require-
ment that a foreign entity expressly abandon the vessel prior to
salvage. Should a salvage operation file an admiralty in rem
motion for declaratory judgment and be met with a sovereign
claim that the ship was never abandoned, the salvor must estab-
lish abandonment by a clear and convincing standard.
d. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked and
Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521 (4th Cir. 2006)
Subsequent to Robert Ballard’s twentieth century discovery of
115. Id. at 640 (citing 40 U.S.C. §2105(a)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 641.
119. Id. at 634 (citing Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co.,
974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992)).
120. Id. at 640.
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the wreckage of the R.M.S. Titanic (“Titanic”), litigation ensued
regarding salvage rights and property interests involving the
United States, France, and Ballard’s company. The Titanic sank
in April, 1912, to a depth of more than 12,000 feet in the north
Atlantic.121 The shipwreck was first discovered in 1985 by Bal-
lard’s group of American and French explorers, and the first
access to the wreck occurred in 1987.122 After 32 dives, approxi-
mately 1800 artifacts were recovered and taken to France for sta-
bilization, conservation, and restoration; and, in 1993, the French
government, through an administrator of the Office of Maritime
Affairs of the Ministry of Equipment, Transportation, and Tour-
ism, awarded the RMST salvage operation title to the artifacts.123
Successively, RMST filed an in rem action in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia against the Titanic wreckage on August 26, 1993,
which established that RMST was the salvor-in-possession124 of
the artifacts already retrieved from the Titanic as well as those
not yet recovered.125 Subsequent to this declaratory judgment
there has been ongoing litigation surrounding the Titanic
wreckage.126
The controversy most on point regarding the salvor’s rights is
the above-referenced from 2005 revolving around the Ballard’s
attempt to have a United States federal court recognize the
French court’s order granting title to salvaged property.127 Since
the discovery of the Titanic wreckage, RMST functioned as the
sole salvage operator of the wreck.128 However, not until February
12, 2004, did RMST file a motion for declaratory judgment asking
for an American court to grant it title “ ‘to all the artifacts (includ-
ing portions of the hull) which are the subject of this action pursu-
ant to the law of finds’ (emphasis added) or, in the alternative, a
salvage award in the amount of $225 million.”129 Additionally,
121. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521, 524
(4th Cir. 2006).
122. Id.
123. Id. (RMST sought a French declaration of ownership because the artifacts
were already located within French sovereign territory for restoration and
preservation).
124. Salvor-in-possession is a term describing R.M.S. Titanic, Inc.’s status as the
court-designated exclusive salvor for the wreck, but subject to extremely strict
controls by the presiding judge.
125. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc., 435 F.3d at 542.
126. Id.
127. Id.at 523.
128. The wreck of the R.M.S. Titanic is in international waters. Id. at 524.
129. Id.
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excluded from this motion were some 1800 artifacts salvaged in
1987 and taken to France because the French government had
already awarded RMST title to that property. RMST did, however,
request that the American court declare the French action valid in
that RMST held proper title to the 1987 artifacts.130
In 2004, the federal district court, “(1) refused to grant comity
and recognize the decision of a French administrator awarding
RMST title to the 1987 artifacts, and (2) rejected RMST’s claim
that it should be awarded title to the artifacts recovered since
1993 under the maritime law of finds.”131 The rationale of the dis-
trict court was that it would be improper to allow RMST to become
the owner of the property while it continued as the salvor-in-pos-
session.132 From this decision, RMST appealed the district court’s
order claiming that the lower court erred by failing to “grant com-
ity” to the French decision and by failing to award title under the
maritime law of finds.133
In its holding on RMST’s claim of error regarding the district
court’s denial to apply the principle of comity to the French deci-
sion, the Fourth Circuit observed that the district court “implicitly
concluded that it had in rem jurisdiction over the 1987 artifacts or
jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment as to them.”134 How-
ever, as of August 1993, when this procedure was commenced, the
1987 artifacts had “already been separated from the Titanic and
transported to France.”135 Thus, “[b]ecause the 1987 artifacts were
not in the Eastern District of Virginia; because they were not
named as the in rem defendant in this case; and because they
were not otherwise voluntarily subjected to the jurisdiction of the
district court, the district court did not have in rem jurisdiction
over them. To exercise in rem jurisdiction over a res, the court
must have the res within its jurisdiction.”136 The error below,
according to the Fourth Circuit, was that the trial court failed to
separate the 1987 artifacts from the wreck itself; therefore, the
Eastern District of Virginia may not assert admiralty in rem juris-
diction over artifacts located outside of its territory and within a
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel Believed to be
the R.M.S. Titanic, 323 F. Supp. 2d 724, 744-45 (E.D. Va. 2004)).
132. Id. at 525.
133. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc., 435 F.3d at 527-30.
134. Id. at 528.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 529.
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sovereign state.137
In addressing the remaining artifacts that RMST moved for
title under the law of finds, the Fourth Circuit contrasts the ten-
year history of RMST serving as the salvor-in-possession under
the law of salvage and RMST’s new position that it is entitled to
the property under the law of finds.138 The court recognized that
“the law of salvage and the law of finds “ ‘serve different purposes
and promote different behaviors.’”139 In principle, the “law of sal-
vage gives potential salvors incentives to render voluntary and
effective aid to people and property in distress at sea . . . [and]
without promise of some remuneration, salvors might understand-
ably be reluctant to undertake the often dangerous and costly
efforts necessary to provide others with assistance.”140
However, the law of finds differs from the law of salvage. The
law of finds is rooted in the principle that he who first finds the
object obtains title over the “un-owned property that [he] has
reduced to [his] possession.”141 This finders-keepers mentality has
limited historical application; thus, “apply[ing] only to objects
found in the state of nature . . . and could thus be reduced to pos-
session by an original ‘finder’.”142 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit
recognized that “[c]ourts . . . have traditionally presumed that
when property is lost at sea, title remains with the true owner,
regardless of how much time has passed.”143 Finally, “under a
regime where the law of finds were to be applied freely, one who
would come upon a lost ship on the high seas would be encouraged
to refrain from attempting to save it and to entertain the idea of
taking the valuable cargo for himself as a finder . . . a free finders-
keepers policy is but a short step from active piracy and pillaging
. . . [therefore] the law of finds is applied sparingly–only when no
private or public interest would be adversely affected by its
application.”144
Responding to this contrast between the law of salvage and
the law of finds, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case with
137. Id. at 530.
138. Id.
139. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc., 435 F.3d at 531 (quoting R.M.S. Titanic, Inc., 323 F.
Supp. 2d at 736-37; see also Herner v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 350, 354-59 (S.D.
N.Y. 1981)).
140. R.M.S. Titanic, 435 F.3d at 530.
141. Id. at 532.
142. Id. (quoting 3A Benedict on Admiralty § 158, at 11-16).
143. Id. (citing Columbus-America Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d
450, 461 (4th Cir. 1992)).
144. Id. at 533.
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instructions for the district court to decide the matter under the
law of salvage, noting that shifting RMST’s role at such a late date
in the salvage would go against the “chivalry” intended by the law
of salvage itself, and would invalidate the trust that the original
court put in RMST when it was established as the salvor-in-
possession.145
In the end,146 the Fourth Circuit declared that the district
court lacked proper maritime in rem jurisdiction for property held
extra-territorially by a sovereign, and continued its position that
the law of salvage should be applied in maritime cases barring
extreme circumstances indicating express abandonment by the
wrecked ship’s original owner.147
e. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified
Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011)
The final case in this line of American opinion involves a ship-
wreck discovered some one hundred miles off of the European
coast; Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. (“Odyssey”), the salvor;
the Republic of Peru; the Kingdom of Spain; and some twenty-five
descendants of Spanish royalty or crewmembers of the wrecked
frigate.148 In March of 2007, Odyssey “discovered a shipwreck in
international waters 100 miles west of the Straits of Gibraltar at a
depth of 1,100 meters . . . .”149 After surveying the wreck site,
Odyssey began to recover objects from the site including some
594,000 coins.150
In 1804, the Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes (“Mercedes”),
was a part of a group of ships traveling from Lima, Peru, to Cadiz,
Spain, by way of Montevideo, Uruguay.151 Aboard the Mercedes at
the time of its sinking was some “900,000 silver pesos, 5,806 gold
pesos, and almost 2000 copper and tin ingots . . . [as well as] two
obsolete bronze cannons . . . being returned to Spain for reuse of
the bronze . . . .”152 Additionally, the Mercedes carried cargo for
145. Id. at 538.
146. Litigation arising out of the salvage of the R.M.S. Titanic is ongoing, with the
most recent decision related to this Article coming as R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked
and Abandoned Vessel, Its Engines, Tackle, Apparel, Appurtenances, Cargo, Etc., 804
F. Supp. 2d 508 (E.D. Va. 2011).
147. Id.
148. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 657
F.3d 1159, 1166 (11th Cir. 2011).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1167, 1173.
152. Id. at 1172-73.
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private individuals transporting items from the Americas to Spain
in a time of war.153 Just after the Mercedes arrived in Peru, France
and Great Britain, no longer delayed by treaty, returned to war154
and the King of England ordered British naval vessels to detain
and return any captured Spanish ships to English ports.155 When
the formation including the Mercedes encountered British war-
ships in battle, the Mercedes quickly exploded and sank.156
Soon after Odyssey began to bring up salvage from the
wrecked remains of this nineteenth-century vessel, it filed in the
Middle District of Florida157 both an in rem admiralty complaint
against the ship, and for an arrest order covering any and all
recovered artifacts from the wreck.158 At the time of filing, Odyssey
did not yet know, nor could it disclose the identity of the found
vessel.159 The Middle District granted Odyssey’s motion for arrest
and appointed Odyssey as the substitute custodian of the ship-
wrecked vessel, thus relieving the Office of the United States Mar-
shall from duty in securing the salvaged items when they were
recovered from the wreck site.160
In response to the Middle District’s grant of Odyssey’s arrest
order, and because rumors began to emerge that the ship found
may have been the Mercedes, Odyssey faced challenges from both
Peru and Spain, as well as the descendants of the ship’s crew and
the Spanish royal family;161 however, once the vessel was recog-
nized as the Mercedes, Spain filed a motion to dismiss Odyssey’s
claims based on Spain’s sovereign immunity given that the Merce-
des was a frigate of war flying a Spanish Royal Navy flag when it
sank.162 Spain’s claim was based on immunity from judicial arrest
153. Id. at 1172.
154. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc., 657 F.3d at 1173.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Jurisdiction in the Middle District of Florida, according to Odyssey Marine’s
Opening Appellate Brief in this matter, is proper because “U.S. Courts sitting in
admiralty have long exercised in rem jurisdiction over shipwrecks located in
international waters, adjudicating both salvage claims and assertions of ownership.”
Appellant’s Opening Brief at xiv, Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. The Kingdom of
Spain, No. 10-10269J, 2010 WL 4279754, at *1 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mason v. The
Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240, 240 (1804)); Houseman v. Schooner North Carolina,
40 U.S. (14 Pet.) 40, 48 (1841); R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 961 (4th
Cir. 1999)).
158. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc., 657 F.3d at 1166.
159. Id. at 1167.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1168.
162. Id.
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guaranteed under federal law in the Federal Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act (“FSIA”).163 Both at the district court and in the Eleventh
Circuit, Spain prevailed because the Mercedes was a Spanish
Royal Naval Frigate at the time of its sinking, and as such, the
“res is ‘immune from . . . arrest’ in United States courts . . . .”164
Thus, the Mercedes was, and is, the sovereign property of Spain.
Among several procedural points on appeal, Odyssey, Peru,
and the twenty-five descendants, argued that the district court
erred by “finding the res is the Spanish warship the Mercedes and
holding the FSIA grants it sovereign immunity.” (emphasis in
original)165
In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the argument
regarding the res in two main points: (1) is the shipwreck that of
the Mercedes; and if so, (2) is the Mercedes protected under the
FSIA from American arrest.166 For the first point, the Eleventh
Circuit analyzed the history of the Mercedes and the “facts sur-
rounding its final mission.”167
The Eleventh Circuit used the historical accounts of the Mer-
cedes from survivors of the sinking, as well as the estimated loca-
tion from the Kingdom of Spain for the wreck, to determine that
because no other similar vessel sank in that zone during that time
period, the wreck discovered by Odyssey must be that of the Mer-
cedes.168 However, Odyssey argued, unsuccessfully, that because
its recovery in salvage is not equal to the cargo of the Mercedes,
and that the wreck was not a whole ship, there is no distinguish-
ing characteristic to positively identify the ship.169
The second question examined by the Eleventh Circuit is that
of whether the FSIA applies to the wreck of the Mercedes. This
determination is based on a two-part test: (1) if the “res at issue is
the property of a foreign state,” and (2) whether the United States
federal courts have jurisdiction over the res under the FSIA.170 The
relevant section of the FSIA is section 1609 which states:
“[s]ubject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act the
property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune
163. Id.; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2012).
164. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc., 657 F.3d at 1166.
165. Id. at 1168.
166. Id. at 1171.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1173-74.
169. Id. at 1174.
170. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc., 657 F.3d at 1175.
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from attachment[,] arrest[,] and execution except as provided in
sections 1610 and 1611 of this [C]hapter.”171 While the Mercedes
does not lie in the territorial waters of the United States, a salvor
may constructively avail himself of jurisdiction in the United
States by bringing part of the res into the United States’ sovereign
territory.172 Here, Odyssey brought portions of the recovered cargo
from the Mercedes into Florida, thus availing itself of Florida’s
federal jurisdiction.173 However, “[b]ecause this is an in rem action
based on the arrest of sovereign property, section 1609 provides
the Mercedes with presumptive immunity from arrest.174
For Odyssey to overcome this finding, it was tasked with
applying an exception either from section 1610 or 1611 of the
FSIA.175176 The appellate court plainly found that Odyssey failed to
meet its burden to prove either exception, but further discussed
the commercial activity exception to the FSIA because Odyssey
asserted such an exception in response to the court’s findings.177
The FSIA grant for immunity for ships on the high seas refer-
ences other international agreements to which the United States
is a party when discussing the relevant immunity.178 Specifically,
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas provides “complete
immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag
State . . . [for] government non-commercial service.”179 Included in
the FSIA is a definition for commercial service that includes
“[e]ither a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular
commercial transaction or act.”180 Given that the Mercedes carried
cargo for private individuals, Odyssey asserted that its activities,
while still a warship of the Royal Spanish Navy, included private
171. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
172. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc., 657 F.3d at 1175 (citing California v. Deep
Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 494 (1998)).
173. Id. (citing R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 967-69 (4th Cir. 1999)
(concluding a shipwreck found in international waters can “constructively” be
considered within the jurisdiction of the district court, although the district court’s
sovereignty over the wreck is a “ ‘shared sovereignty,’ shared with other nations
enforcing the same [law of all nations]”)).
174. Id. (second emphasis omitted).
175. Id. at 1175-76.
176. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1610-11 (Section 1610
preserves a court’s right to attach the property of a foreign sovereign in the United
States if such property is used for commercial purposes and Section 1611 allows
Presidential override of judicial arrest).
177. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc., 657 F.3d at 1176.
178. Id. (citing Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1609).
179. Id. (citing Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
450 U.N.T.S. 11).
180. Id. (citing Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)).
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and commercial activity totaling seventy-five percent of its lost
cargo, thus coming within the exception of the FSIA.181
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that there was a trove of pri-
vate material being transported aboard the Mercedes at the time
that it sank, but found that such material was still sovereign in
nature because citizens of Spain were transporting it aboard a
sovereign vessel during a time of war.182 Because Spain was acting
in a sovereign manner in transporting the cargo, and because the
Mercedes was a Spanish Royal Navy vessel, the FSIA preempted
any claim by Odyssey that it should be granted ownership of the
cargo of the Mercedes via an in rem action in an American court.183
VI. CONCLUSION:
Today’s salvors have an increasingly complex maze to navi-
gate given United States’ courts routinely uncertain choice of doc-
trine to apply to disputes based on preference rather than
established jurisprudence. No longer is there a system of finder’s
keepers, nor is there a clear law of salvage. A claimant must navi-
gate an unsettled area of law that involves international, federal,
state, and common law elements that frequently intertwine
amongst themselves.
A common law analysis of how courts repeatedly tasked with
addressing this issue is the principle way of developing a sound
method to litigating future disputes. From the cases examined in
this note, several key principles of law emerge for anyone moving
forward in a similar case. Courts today require clear and convinc-
ing evidence of abandonment for the law of finds to apply in mari-
time salvage cases; the law of salvage is a time-tested method to
both recover lost property and reward those who absorbed the risk
during the salvage operation; and finally that the federal govern-
ment is not always on the side of the states when international
relationships are thrown into a salvage dispute. While some of
these principles are more likely to emerge in future disputes, this
note only draws from the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits,
which all have already existing jurisprudence in the arena of mar-
itime salvage law. There is no clear indication as to what an out-
come may be should a case be brought in a less experienced
Circuit. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has been noticeably
restrained in advancing its body of law beyond a basic analysis
181. Id. at 1177.
182. Id.
183. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc., 657 F.3d at 1178.
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comparing the law of finds and the law of salvage–opening the
door for more complex disputes in areas of relative first impres-
sion before the court.
Thus, with increasing international involvement in both the
realms of commerce and cultural preservation, American courts
may well shift again to focus more on international norms rather
than the established jurisprudence of the past thirty years; thus, a
salvor must proceed at his own peril.
